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Abstrat
A simple omputer simulation model of a losed market on a xed
network with free ow of goods and money is introdued. The model
ontains only two variables : the amount of goods and money beside
the size of the system. An initially at distribution of both variables
is presupposed. We show that under ompletely random rules, i.e.
through the hoie of interating agent pairs on the network and of
the exhange rules that the market stabilizes in time and shows di-
versiation of money and goods. We also indiate that the dierene
between poor and rih agents inreases for small markets, as well as for
systems in whih money is steadily dedued from the market through
taxation.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.10.Ln, 89.75.-k, 07.05.Tp, 05.65.+b
1 Introdution
Numerous works have inspired physiists and guided them towards the stud-
ies of nanial markets. We ould start with Bahelier (1900) [1℄ who intro-
dued what shall perhaps remain the simplest and most suessful model for
prie variations based on Gaussian statistis [2℄. On the other hand, Pareto
(1897) [3℄ had observed that large prie variations seem to be desribed by a
urve interpolating between two power-laws.
For an eonophysiist using statistial mehanis as primary support of
investigations, nature seems to work as a self-organized system. [4℄ Sal-
ing laws are everywhere, but rarely ontain yles. Nevertheless it is un-
derstandable that physiists try to onvine themselves that there is some
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puntuated equilibrium in eonomy, i.e. a market an be in a metastable
equilibrium.
A fundamental question is that of `'value; not only value of money, but
more generally the value of goods [5℄. In fat, in extreme situations, pries
may not represent atual values. For instane, in the aftermath of a natural
disaster, the amount of destrution - measured using pre-disaster pries - is
a poor proxy for atual welfare losses, beause of reonstrution onstraints
and interations with basi needs. We will not debate on whether there is
a real value of goods here
2
, but will onsider whether in absene of suh a
notion a free market an exist, and if so what would be its harateristis.
Markets surely started through barter, but later exhange of goods needed
money for a surviving eonomy In the real world, money seems needed for
a funtioning of the eonomy. Changes in the quantity of money may aet
this funtioning through ination and deation proesses. However, there is
strong empirial evidene that hanges in the quantity of money aet the
true value of goods, at least on the short term and modify the risk faed by
agents, see e.g. [7℄. Moreover we all omplain about taxes, not only on inome
and apital, but also about so alled VAT, imposed on any transation. We
will not debate their value, but it is of interest to examine whether taxes
inuene the harateristis of very simple exhange markets.
Let us also, for the sake of perspetive, refer to a few previous reports
on the question of wealth and values within physis researh work. Models
of pries are too numerous to be realled here. Models of values and wealth
are sometimes quite elaborate. Sine we wish to devise a basi algorithm we
only reall here below the following ones.
Pianegonda et al. [8, 9℄ in a series of papers introdued one dimensional
models of wealth redistributions. It was of interest to ompare things when
the ommerial links were frozen with the ase in whih the eonomial agents
an hoose their ommerial partners at eah time step. Das and Yarlagadda
[10℄ mathematially analyzed a simple market model where trading at eah
point in time involves only two agents with the sum of their money being on-
served and with neither parties oming out with negative money after the
interation proess. The exhange involved random re-distribution among
the two players of a xed fration of their total money. Chakraborti [11℄
studied the distributions of money for dierent types of monetary transa-
tions. He examined a model in whih the agents invest equal amounts of
2
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money in eah transation. Chatterjee [12℄ studied the Pareto law appear-
ane in a kineti model of market with random saving propensity, A pairwise
exhange model using a slightly dierent exhange rule has been published by
Slanina [13℄. He also introdued the possibility of money entering or leaving
at eah exhange point.
Following the work by , Patriara, Chakrabarti and Kaski (PCK)[?℄, Rih-
mond et al. managed to solve their ollision model analytially and showed
that as formulated, it does not aount for the observed data. The Pareto
exponent for the CPK exhange model is exatly one. Values greater than
1 are not admitted by the model without introduing additional omplexity
suh as memory, breaking the onservation of money during the exhange
proess or modifying the exhange rule as indeed was done by Slanina. CPK
and oworkers only did a numerial simulation and onluded that beause
they got a 'Pareto exponent' just above one (they atually got 1.03) the
model ould aount for the real data. The papers [15, 16, 17℄ show 'au
ontraire', that it ould not!! In fat, the Generalised Lotka Volterra solu-
tion is well able to t the real data. As a result it is believed that the CPK
exhange model may be abandoned - or at least require serious modiation.
Some eonomists also have strong philosophial objetions to this partiular
exhange model.
Reently Manolova et al. [18, 19℄ have studied an eonomy onsisting of a
nite number of agents loated on a one-dimensional torus. Eah agent buys
a set of goods from its nearest (left) neighbor, produes some other goods,
sells goods to its nearest (right) neighbor and onsumes the rest. Thus,
there are two opposite uxes on the torus - goods and money. Eah agent
attempts to maximize a risk aversion utility funtion of the expeted pro-
dued and onsumed quantities w.r.t. its prodution and exhange deision.
Information is loal - eah agent knows only the history of its own buy, sell,
and prodution deisions. The individual agents plan over a revolving time
horizon of two periods. Thus, in eah period, the agents must form anti-
ipations about what will happen in the next period (mean and variane),
based on their past experienes. The authors investigated the transitory and
permanent impat of loal or global injetions of money on the dynamis
of exhanged quantities, pries, and individual welfare, and the mehanisms
that explain this evolution.
The distribution of wealth among the members of suh a soiety is often
assumed to result from one fundamental mehanism: trade. More sophisti-
ated models assume two mehanisms, like trade and savings [11℄ or trade
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and investment [20℄. Others take into aount good produtions like in ref.
[21℄: it was shown that the dynamis of exhange value in a system om-
posed of many interating agents exhibit ooperative emergene and ollapse
of global value for individual goods. Several extensions have been proposed
and published.
It is still apparently unlear whether a more simple onstraint leads to
wealth redistribution, or to huge disparity in the soiety. It is of interest to
use similar ideas, as those of previously quoted authors, onsidering agents as
interating randomly, e.g. around a table, still imposing a onstant amount of
money and yet a onstant amount of goods, the exhange involving random
re-distribution between two agents of a fration of their total money and
goods, with onstraints to be dened in Set.2.
The goal of suh a basi approah is thus to devise the most basi model of
exhanges wealth redistribution under the most simple rules, and value de-
nition, i.e. when there is no antiipation, nor utility (like saving) onstraint.
In setion 3, we will outline the Monte Carlo steps done for implementing
the model. We present a few results in Set.4, - it will be seen that one an
imagine a soiety made of two groups, the merhants, having goods (and
money), the bankers having money (and goods). We end with onlusions in
Set.5.
2 Model
We present here a very simple model of goods and money ow. In the
model we onsider a onstant number, N , of agents, eah possessing at the
beginning the same amount of goods, alled here apples, and money (e.g.
euro). At eah step an agent is arbitrarily seleted to look randomly for a
partner from whom she may want to buy apples. With a 50 % probability
the deision ould be either yes, I want to buy, or no, I do not want to buy.
The deision does not depend neither on previous deisions nor on any other
fator. It is ompletely random. The details are explained in the algorithm
given below. Then it is determined randomly how many apples she would
like to buy from suh the partner, and how muh money she is willing to
pay. Then the partner is heked whether she has enough apples and if so,
whether she wants to sell. When both answers are positive, the transation
is made and the apples and money are appropriately transferred. In suh a
way there is no predetermined diretion of neither ow. The total amount
4
of money and goods are onserved throughout the proess. The same is for
the number of agents. Even if somebody sold all her apples and run out of
money, she still stays in the game, although rather as an observer, sine she
an neither buy nor sell.
When we agreed that, like in the Manolova et al. paper [18℄, agents are
pinpointed and the exhange is done only between nearest neighbors, we
found that the dynamis stopped quikly, sine if lose to a rih agent there
is a very poor one, no trading is possible. Therefore in our model there is no
xed link among agents (or spatial position) and the underlying network of
onnetions is a dynamial one.
The algorithm is the following:
1. hose randomly agent j,
2. hek whether she has money and determine, with a 50 % probability
(ipping a oin), whether she wants to buy,
3. determine how many apples (from 1 to 5, the maximum we allowed )
and for how muh (random fration of the total amount of money she
has),
4. nd, randomly, another agent k,
5. hek whether she has enough apples to sell to the agent j,
6. if so, determine whether she wants to sell, again by tossing a oin,
7. when positive, pass the apples from k to j and money from j to k,
8. whenN times the hoie 1 has been made, one Monte Carlo Step (MCS)
has been ompleted.
During the simulation we have reorded the following quantities:
• amount of apples sold
• amount of money transferred
• number of transations
• maximum of apples possessed
• maximum of money possessed
5
• distribution of apples
• distribution of money
In so doing we onsider that the eonomy is bipolar : there are more
merhant-like agents", with their distribution and status haraterized by
the number of apples they own, and more banker-like agents haraterized
by the amount of money. Of ourse, bankers have (buy or sell) apples and
merhants own some money as well, beside having apples.
3 Results
We have performed our simulations with the following values of the parame-
ters: the total number of agents N = 60, initial amount of money per agents
(the same for all) = 50 (EUR), initial amount of apples, also 50. The sim-
ulations were performed till 10000 MCS and the results averaged over 500
independent runs, whih gave us quite good statistis. We have heked how
robust the results are with respet to the hanges in the size of the market,
hene the number of agents, and the amount of goods (apples) and money
attributed at the beginning to eah agent.
The time dependene of the maximum amount of apples and money is
presented in gure 1 on a doubly logarithmi sale. It is seen that although
asymptotially both urves are at, the rihest agent arrives at her maximum
faster than her olleague having the maximum number of apples. This eet
is most probably due to the fat that in order to slow down the dynamis
we allowed at most 5 apples to be sold in a single transation. On the other
hand we did not put any limit on the prie, whih is restrited only by the
amount of money in the poket of the buying agent.
Although the prie is randomly determined by the seller and also ran-
domly aepted, or not, by the buyer, the utuations on the number of
transations per time, the number of exhanged apples and amount of money,
show only little satter and remain at approximately the same levels (11, 11,
35 respetively) throughout the simulations.
The distribution of wealth, shown in gure 2, as well as the distribution
of goods (gure 3) show that the initial distributions peaked at the values
50, spread quite fast and after some 1000 MCS there is already some amount
of agents owing many apples and others beoming quite rih. It should be
noted that the distributions are neither symmetri, nor are they similar one
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Figure 1: Time dependene of the maximum amount of money and apples
owned by one person. Logarithmi sales
to another. The distribution of wealth shows many agents possessing below
20 EUR and just a few (the rih bankers) having more than 140. The
distribution of apples is not so drasti, but again the majority of agents
has below 20 apples; there are few (rih) merhants. This asymmetry with
respet to the wealth distribution is the results of our soialist restrition
on the maximum of apples sold in one transation.
This log-log plot (Fig. 2) reovers the ndings of Pareto for prie dis-
tributions, [3℄ i.e., the (money) wealth variations seem to be desribed by
a urve interpolating between two power-laws with some rossover. What
an be pointed out is the relative stability of the rossover point, and the
asymptoti nature of the power laws, respetively -0.5 and -2.0 at low and
high (money) wealth. The (good) value distribution (Fig. 3) i s dierent
from the (money) wealth, at low value, due to the type of market we impose.
However a similar -2.0 asymptoti power law is found for the large amount
of goods in possession of the (rih in goods) agents.
We have been also interested how the results generated by our simple
model hange when we allow for a larger amount of agents. Therefore we
hanged the number N of agents to 20 and 100. Most interesting would
be the time development of the maximum of apples and money, sine for
the average prie and the distributions one would expet the same behavior,
regardless of the size of the market. As ould be seen from gures 4 and 5,
the urves, after appropriate saling, are quite similar. In the gure 4 the
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Figure 2: Distribution of money in several time moments, shown on a log-log
sale
data for N = 60 were divided by 1.22 and the data for N by 1.32, while in
the gure 5 the ratios were 1.42 and 1.60, respetively.
Finally, we deided to hek if our model is sensitive to some modia-
tions, therefore we introdued taxes. At eah transation a ertain amount
of money paid goes not to the seller but to the state, hene disappears from
the market, whih is no longer losed, as far as money is onerned. Notie
that the ref.[22℄ paper on the Lotka Volterra approah is also an exhange
model where the so-alled autoatalyti term allows the redistribution or ex-
tration of money from all agents simultaneously. In this sense it an mimi
a tax.
For the present onsiderations we invented a at tax rate of 1 % on
the money whih is exhanged. The amount of apples remains onstant.
The hanges in the results are presented in gures 6 and 7. The remaining
harateristis, like the number of transations, are the same as in the losed
market. In the gures we present data for the ase of N = 60 agents, eah
having at the beginning 50 apples and 50 euros. As seen, the eet of taxes
is not immediately felt, - as often ! The maximum number of apples owned
by the best merhants inreases with time, - it aelerates when taxation is
oming into play, on the rihest agents, for levelling o, when the taxation
eet is slowing down.
Figure 8 shows the eet of taxation on the distribution of wealth in the
soiety. It is lear that taxation, whih in our model redues the amount
8
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Figure 3: Distribution of apples in several time moments, shown on a log-log
s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Figure 4: Time dependene of the maximum number of apples in one hand,
for so alled small, medium and large market; log-log sales.
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Figure 5: Time dependene of the maximum amount of money in one hand,
for so alled small, medium and large markets; log-log s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Figure 6: Maximum of apples and money owned in the ases without and
with 1% tax; log-log plot
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Figure 7: Average prie per apple in the ases without and with tax; normal
sales
of money irulating in the system, has similar eet like reduing the initial
amount of money reeived by eah agent. However this is not seen at the
initial stages of the simulation and the distributions of wealth after, say
1000 MCS, show no essential dierenes between the ase with taxes and no
taxes. After 10000 MCS there were no rih agents (having more than 100
euros) in the system with taxes and there were relatively many having just
below 5 euros. We may therefore onlude that in the system with taxes
the dierene between the rihest and the poorest agent is smaller than in
the system without taxes, - quite natural indeed. Also the average prie per
apple (gure 7) goes down signiantly. This however does not imply that
in a system with taxes the agents are, on average, better o. As shown in
gure 8, there are more poor agents in that ase. It should be also notied
that in our simple model the tax money is dissipated, it simply disappears
from the system, without being reintrodued into it in any way.
The distributions of apples, even in the nal stage, are quite similar in
the two ases.
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Figure 8: Final distribution of money in the ase with and without taxes on
a log-log plot. N = 60.
4 Conlusions
We have presented a very simple model of a losed marked with free exhange
of goods and wealth. The model ontains just the following parameters: size
of the market (number of agents) and the amount of goods and money owned
initially by eah agent. The role played in the dynamis by eah of these
fators has been investigated and disussed. The role of initial onditions
has not been examined: e.g. we have also assumed an initially uniform
distribution. We have imposed ompletely random rules, i.e. the amount of
goods and the aepted prie, as well as the trade deisions have no relation
to trends, previous ativity, antiipation, savings, et. Also partners for
trading are hosen randomly among all agents. This is found to be very
relevant in view of maintaining a dynami eonomy. This does not require
money or good injetions as in Manolova et al. work. [19℄, as often thought
of politially speaking as well. Of ourse, there is a atalyti eet, in
imposing ination, as qualitatively seen in omparing our results with theirs.
Suh a free market stabilizes itself pretty soon,  the average prie, num-
ber of transations, number of goods sold and money paid for them, beome
asymptotially xed in time. In some sense there is an intrinsially gener-
ated (self-organized) utility funtion. The distribution of money and goods
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shows a stratiation of the soiety: there are poor and wealthy agents;
some have money, others own goods. This division is deeper in shallow
markets, i.e. when there is less money and goods irulating. Apart from
that, many other harateristis of the market (number of transations, av-
erage prie, et) have similar behavior and do not depend in a qualitative
way on the size of the market. Most of the results appear quite natural.
Considering harateristi exponents of power law tails for wealth distri-
butions, there seems to be a trend away from Pareto's values of 1.5 to slightly
higher values. It an be wondered [23℄ if this represents the impat of so-
ialism sine a higher slope value is assoiated with greater redistribution of
money, as we found, whereas a low value of the Pareto exponent suggests
the rih really are rih and the poor are poor. Notie that in the presently
examined exhange market, one an be rih either beause of owning money
or beause of having many apples. There is no king owning both.
We have also onsidered the ase when part of the money disappears from
the market under the form of taxes, at eah transation. We have found
that many harateristis are quite similar to the no tax ase, but again
the dierene is mostly seen in the distribution of wealth, i.e., the poor gets
poorer and the rih gets riher. Most of the results appear quite natural.
Notie also that reent studies of UK data show that the Pareto exponent
assoiated with the medium to high inome range has over the deade 1992 -
2002 dereased from 3.3 to 2.7. During this period taxation has inreased[23℄
. It an be wondered [23℄ if this represents the impat of soialism sine a
higher slope value is assoiated with greater redistribution of money, whereas
a low value of the Pareto exponent suggests the rih really are rih and the
poor are poor.
We are aware that in our simple model we have muh redued maro and
miro eonomy onditions and therefore further modiations of our model
may be needed. This however will redue the simpliity and transpareny of
the present model (Okham razor).
In future work, it ould be useful to disuss the dierenes between
lassial and neolassial theories of prie/apple and value/money. The rele-
vane of trade transations in whih the pries dier in time depending on the
quantity of values/pries (or money/goods) to be exhanged at a given time
through (several) interating agents, as in real eonomi soieties should be
examined. The relationship between trading volume and the pries of both
nanial assets and ommodities is also of signiant relevane to eonomists,
traders and politiians.
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